Philosophical Scepticism and Normal Incredulity

The Limits of Knowledge (Scepticism)

In this course, Dr Ema Sullivan-Bissett (University of Birmingham) explores the limits of knowledge (scepticism). In the first module, we contrast normal incredulity to philosophical scepticism, and examine various ways to remove grounds for doubt. In the second module, we come to look at how Descartes arrives at his three stages of doubt, laying the groundwork for the sceptical challenge. In the third module, we turn to Descartes’ response to the sceptical challenge, before looking at Locke’s response in the fourth module. In the fifth module, we examine Berkely’s idealism in response to the sceptical challenge. In the sixth module, we evaluate G.E. Moore’s proof of an external world. Finally, in the seventh module, we consider whether a possible response to scepticism can be found in contextualism.

Philosophical Scepticism and Normal Incredulity

In this module, we examine philosophical scepticism and normal incredulity, focusing in particular on (i) cases of ordinary scepticism (ii) two ways of removing grounds for ordinary doubt (iii) the suspension of judgment in the context of philosophical doubt (iv) external world scepticism.