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Metaethics: Moral Anti-Realism
- About this Course
- About this Lecturer
About this Course
In this course, Dr Luke Elson (University of Reading) explores what it means to be a moral anti-realist. We begin in the first module by thinking about what moral anti-realism actually is. After that, in the second module, we outline four reasons why someone might be an anti-realist. In the following three modules, we think about three anti-realist positions: first, A. J. Ayer’s theory of emotivism; second, R. M. Hare’s theory of prescriptivism; and third, J. L. Mackie’s Error Theory. In the sixth and seventh modules, we think about two of the major weaknesses of anti-realism: first, its inability to explain moral disagreements; and second, its inability to explain moral progress. Finally, in the eighth module, we think about the extent to which moral anti-realism leads to nihilism. And in that case, why be moral at all?
About the Lecturer
Luke Elson is a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Reading. His research interests include ethics, reasons and rationality, especially when they involve vagueness.