About the lecture

In this module, we focus on another argument for dualism—the conceivability argument. This argues that the fact that we can conceive of a world where mind and body are separate—for example, a world in which ‘zombies’ exist (i.e. bodies without minds)—is itself proof of mind-body dualism.

About the lecturer

Cressida is a teaching fellow in the Philosophy Department at University College, London. Prior to this she was a Visiting Scholar at the Institute of Philosophy, University of London.

In April, 2014, she completed her PhD at CUNY Graduate Center in Philosophy of Mind/Philosophy of Psychology. She has researched a wide range of philosophical topics throughout her BA at the University of Sydney, and MPhil at the University of Cambridge, and is interested in the following areas: Cognitive Science, Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Ethics, Aesthetics, Epistemology and the Philosophy of Food.