About the lecture

In this lecture, we examine utilitarianism, focusing on: (i) its foundational principle that the right action is the one which maximises happiness and minimises unhappiness across society; (ii) its opposition to minimalist ethics that dismiss pleasure as valuable, emphasising instead that pleasure is inherently good as long as it does not lead to future harm; (iii) its contrast with elitist moral views, advocating that everyone’s interests matter equally and promoting more egalitarian approaches to wealth distribution; (iv) its opposition to disgust-based ethics, asserting that actions should not be judged solely on emotional responses like disgust, but on whether they cause harm or benefit; (v) Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarian calculus, where actions are evaluated based on factors such as intensity, duration, extent, and uncertainty; (vi) the significance of fecundity and purity in calculating the long-term effects of actions, distinguishing between immediate pleasures or pains and their subsequent consequences; (vii) the use of the hedonic calculus to assign a score to actions by considering their effects on all individuals involved, summing the total pleasure and pain they cause; (viii) the recognition that while the hedonic calculus may not be practical for daily decisions, it sets a standard for evaluating actions and should guide decision-making in the background.

About the lecturer

Hilary Greaves is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Oxford and a Fellow of Merton College. Her research interests include ethics, decision theory, and the philosophy of physics, with a particular focus on population ethics, moral uncertainty, and effective altruism. Her recent publications include Population Axiology: The Moral Importance of Population Size (2022), Moral Uncertainty (2020, co-authored with William MacAskill), and Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues (2021, edited with Theron Pummer).