About the lecture

In this module, Claire turns to Jeremy Bentham, the philosopher who gave utilitarianism its first full exposition. Bentham's version of utilitarianism was grounded in the social and legal reforms that were taking place at the beginning of the 19th century, and were particularly concerned with the justification of laws. Claire examines two key aspects of Bentham's version of utilitarianism: psychological egoism (which claims that we only truly desire what's good for ourselves), and the hedonic calculus (by which Bentham we could assess the utility represented by any particular event).

About the lecturer

Dr. Claire Benn received her PhD in July 2014 from the University of Cambridge. She received her MPhil in 2010 and her BA in 2009 also from the University of Cambridge. Her area of specialization is in ethics, and she is also interested in philosophy of technology, political philosophy and logic.

In her doctoral thesis, The Nature and Value of the Supererogatory, she gives a substantive account of what it is for an action to go above and beyond the call of duty. She also shows why ethical theories and individuals need to make room for such actions, theoretically and practically. Her thesis helps to grant us insight into a wonderfully positive side of our moral lives. Often overlooked in the traditional ethical discussions of liars, murderers, promise-breakers and thieves, Dr. Benn’s analysis of the realm of the supererogatory instead encourages us to take more seriously those modest gift-givers, blood-donors, saints and heroes who similarly populate our moral world. Dr. Benn’s work as a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute concerns the ethics of technology. Much of the current debate in the ethics of technology has focused on the ways in which innovations in technology provide opportunities for us to act in wrong and impermissible ways. Dr. Benn’s research project, “Artificial Goodness: Being and Doing Good in the Digital Age,” will assess whether innovations in the rapidly developing technologies of artificiality can also lead to changes in the opportunities, means and nature of what it is to be and to do good. She will begin by exploring three areas—virtual realities, robotic agents, and responsibility to, as well as for, technological artefacts—asking in each whether there really is a distinction to be drawn between doing good and ‘merely’ seeming to be good.